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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS: IN FAVOUR OF SYNERGY
Fiona de Londras*

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN, SCHOOL OF LAW

I. INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes said that the United States has a particular antipathy to international law and
internationalism; that it neither ‘gets it’ nor wants to ‘get it’.1 This, in my view, is a
misrepresentation of the position of the United States in respect of international law generally,
although it is perhaps somewhat closer to the truth in relation to international human rights
law than in other areas.2 This representation of the United States’ alleged relationship with
international law reflects the fact that both the US and a substantial portion of the international
legal community are engaged in a process of mythologizing in relation to one another that
perhaps reaches its zenith when it concerns international human rights law. The United States
is mythologized as an isolationist and anti‐internationalist legal system,3 while international
*

Fiona de Londras (BCL, LL.M., Ph.D (NUI)); Lecturer, UCD School of Law. E.mail: fiona.delondras@ucd.ie. This
paper was begun for a presentation at a conference entitled, ‘Civil Rights in the Obama Era’ at Valparaiso
University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Penelope Andrews for the invitation to participate and to all
who attended for their comments and observations.
1

Peter Spiro documents some of ways in which the United States has a antipathetic relationship with international
law in The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and its False Prophets 79 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 9 (2000)

2

I classify the United States Supreme Court as á la carte internationalist. See Fiona de Londras, Dualism, Domestic
Courts and the International Rule of Law in IUS GENTIUM: THE RULE OF LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Mortimer Sellers
and Tadeusz Tomaszewski, eds, 2010). In relation to international human rights law and treaties, however, the
United States has traditionally shown reluctance to effectively bind itself to such treaties either by non‐ratification
or, where a treaty is ratified, by non‐incorporation and the express designation of a treaty as non‐self‐executing
and therefore not incorporated into law by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Kenneth Roth, The
Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties 1 CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 347
(2000). For an overview of the United States position relating to international law generally, including reflections
on international law, see the thoughtful and careful analysis in David Bederman, Globalization, International Law
and United States Foreign Policy 50 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 717 (2001).
3

See, for example, Thomas Hughes, The Twilight of Internationalism 61 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 25 (1985‐86) (tracing the
growth of anti‐internationalist sentiment in the United States); Alison Dundes Renteln, Who’s Afraid of the CRC:
Objections to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 3 ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 629
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human rights law is mythologized as a top‐down, ‘un‐American’, and anti‐democratic
enterprise.4
The first step for anyone concerned with highlighting the potential for international human
rights law to play a valuable role in rights‐related litigation in the United States is to ‘myth‐bust’
in both directions. In this article I intend to argue that in fact United States constitutional civil
rights law and international human rights law share a common core of values and purposes that
make them the ideal theatre in which synergistic and catalytic interaction between domestic
and international law can take place. This is, indeed, the type of relationship between domestic
and international law that is foreseen and intended by international human rights law and has
happened in other jurisdictions and contexts, such as in relation to LGBT rights in (Western)
Europe.
I do not intend to argue that international human rights law is binding in domestic law. The
status of international human rights law in domestic legal systems is a matter for those systems
themselves. Under US constitutional law international human rights law is part of federal
common law inasmuch as it is customary international law and reliant on incorporation
inasmuch as it is contained in non‐self‐executing treaties ratified by the United States with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The argument made out here does not seek to challenge
that. Rather, this article argues that international human rights law is an appropriate source of
persuasive authority that ought to be pleaded in cases of constitutional rights interpretation.
This might ensure that, to the extent possible within the text and structure of the Constitution
itself, rights afforded constitutional protection are harmonious with international human rights
law in terms of content and scope. International human rights law, then, is presented as an
interpretive aid in domestic rights interpretation, application and enforcement.
The first part of this article expands on the appropriate relationship between international and
domestic rights law and argues that it is one of synergy rather than one of superiority or
inferiority. Far from the myriad adjudicatory bodies that have appeared in international human
rights law representing some kind of strong‐arm measures by international law, their
admissibility rules in particular show that the desired state of affairs is one in which rights are
effectively protected in the domestic sphere without any recourse to the international legal
machinery. The article then goes on to illustrate the type of synergistic relationship that is
possible between domestic and international rights‐protecting law by means of the example of
(1996‐97) (noting the “anti‐international attitude which seems prevalent in [the United States] in the 1990s” at
636).
4

See, for example, ERIC POSNER & JACK GOLDSMITH, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006) (on international law
generally); John O. McGuinness & Ilya Somin, Democracy and Human Rights Law 84 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1739
(2009); John O. McGuinness & Ilya Somin, Should International Law be Part of Our Law? 59 STANFORD LAW REVIEW
1175 (2007)
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LGBT rights in Europe. In several different areas of LGBT rights activism and advocacy, litigants
found it necessary to bring their cases to the European Court of Human Rights,5 based in
Strasbourg. These cases were brought for the purposes of resolving whether domestic laws, by
which sexual and gender minorities were differentially treated, were permissible under the
European Convention on Human Rights.6 What is important about these cases, from the
perspective of this article, is that they frequently involved the Court in using synergistic
decision‐making processes such as ‘European consensus’ in adjudicating on the complaints
before them.
Having established the possibility of a synergistic relationship between international and
domestic human rights law in the second part of the article and the desirability and
appropriateness of such a relationship in the first part, the third part of this article goes on to
consider whether such a relationship is possible or appropriate in the United States given the
constitutional position of international law. In this Part, I argue that although there are some
prima facie structural impediments to the use of international human rights law in
constitutional rights adjudication, these impediments are not insurmountable. However,
successfully overcoming them requires a particular attitudinal approach to international human
rights law that may require acculturation.

II. SYNERGY OR SUPERIORITY
When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights7 was signed in 1948 few people could have
foreseen the immense development of international human rights law that would emerge over
the next sixty years. In this short period of time we have seen international human rights law
progress from a set of normative statements, purely declaratory in manner (at least at the
outset8) to a plethora of binding international instruments (both universal,9 regional10 and
5

This is the court that adjudicates on individual and inter‐state complaints under the European Convention on
Human Rights as well as providing advisory opinions on the rare occasions in which the Council of Europe requests
same. For an overview of the history and operation of the European Court of Human Rights and its organisational
home—the Council of Europe—see DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, ED BATES & CARLA BUCKLEY, HARRIS, O’BOYLE &
nd
WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (2 ed., 2009), Chapter 1.
6

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953
7

G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)

8

On the influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the development of international human rights
th
law see Juan E. Mendez, Anniversary Contributions: International Human Rights Law: 60 Anniversary of the UDHR
30 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1157 (2009)
9

Universal human rights law instruments are both general and specific. The general human rights law instruments
making up what is known as the International Bill of Rights are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (G.A. res.

6
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organisational11); human rights clauses in Security Council Chapter VII Resolutions;12 human
rights tie‐ins in regional trade agreements;13 and international adjudicatory bodies with
jurisdiction over treaty‐based rights claims. These international adjudicatory bodies range from
courts with jurisdiction over individual and inter‐state complaints to treaty‐specific committees,
many of which also have the capacity to hear and adjudicate upon individual complaints.
The development of these international adjudicatory bodies is a clear recognition of the need
for rights not only to be enshrined in international instruments but also to be effectively
protected.14 In this context, it is abundantly clear that international human rights law’s
preference is for effective protection to take place on the domestic level—international
adjudicatory bodies are intended and designed to play a supplementary and complementary
role. This is most clearly demonstrated by the admissibility requirement in almost all of these
international bodies that a complainant would have exhausted all domestic remedies (or have
no reasonable prospect of success in domestic law) before going to the international sphere for
resolution.15 The subsidiary nature of these adjudicatory bodies’ jurisdictions reflects the

2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3,
1976). There are also specific universal human rights instruments such as, although not limited to, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (G.A.
res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990).
10

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 7; Convention
on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978; African [Banjul]
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982),
entered into force Oct. 21, 1986; Arab Charter on Human Rights September 15, 1994, reprinted in 18 Hum. Rts. L.J.
151 (1997).
11

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (Dec. 7, 2000).

12

See, for example, Operative Paragraph 6, Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) providing that “[s]tates must
ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and
should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights,
refugee, and humanitarian law”.
13

See generally FREDERICK ABBOTT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (2006).

14

A commitment to effective protection of rights is a clear priority of international human rights courts in
particular. See, for example, Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439.
15

Article 41, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 10; Article 5(2), Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 23, 1976); Article 35(1), European Convention
on Human Rights, supra note 7; Article 46(1), American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 11; Article 6(2),
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights (June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III))
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nature of the ideal relationship between international and domestic human rights protection as
both a reflective and a synergistic one. International human rights law ought to reflect common
values and fundamental principles (or at least, those that might have been said to have been
common and fundamental to the predominantly western states involved in the emergence of
international human rights law16) and to offer an interlocutor with which domestic human
rights (or ‘civil liberties’) law can converse towards an advantageous outcome. Indeed, it is the
reflectiveness of international human rights law that makes it appropriate as a synergistic
partner to domestic constitutional law in liberal legalistic constitutional orders such as that
found in the United States.
At their cores, both international human rights law and domestic constitutional law are built on
a common dignitary conception of individual liberty and restriction of state activities.17 In both
systems—particularly in relation to civil and political rights, which historically have more
traction in most domestic jurisdictions18—human rights or civil liberties law is designed to
ensure that the state may interfere with one’s actions only inasmuch as that interference is
necessary, proportionate, and objectively justifiable. When boiled down to this core
constitutionalist value, we can see that domestic and international rights standards that may, at
first glance, appear to be ‘different’ to one another are in fact more similar than might have
been thought and are capable of synergistic existence. Domestic standards and actions can
influence international conceptions of rights‐content and the acceptability of state actions and
vice‐versa. It therefore makes immense common sense for the jurisprudence of domestic and
international courts and other adjudicatory bodies to inform each other’s activities in
interpreting the scope and content of relevant rights protections.
These authorities would not be binding precedents, but persuasive ones. In this way,
international human rights law can play its logical catalytic role whereby the articulation,
(providing that admissibility is to be decided on the basis of the same terms as laid down in Article 56 of the
African [Banjul] Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (supra note 11)—Article 56(5) requires complaints only to
be sent after “exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it is obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged”).
16

That the ‘international community’ as it existed at the time of the foundation of the United Nations was
dominated by western states is well accepted and indeed presents some difficulties in terms of using the
nomenclature ‘international community’. It is used in this article to describe the fora, organisations, law‐making
bodies and interactions of states in relatively formalised multilateral contexts. For more on the problematic nature
of the term ‘international community’ see, for example, Diane Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The
Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference 5 SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 337‐364 (1996)
17

For a masterful overview of the concept of dignity in the evolution of individual rights both domestically and
internationally, including consideration of the limited nature of dignity and rights at the outset of the American
Constitution (especially in relation to women, slaves and Native Americans) see JACK DONNELLY, HUMAN DIGNITY AND
th
HUMAN RIGHTS, Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the 60 Anniversary of the UDHR, (2009), available at
http://www.udhr60.ch/report/donnelly‐HumanDignity_0609.pdf (last accessed: November 25, 2009).
18

Economic and social rights tend to face serious difficulties in terms of justiciability and enforceability in domestic
jurisdictions. See, for example, Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio‐
Economic Rights in National Law 22 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 35 (2006‐2007)
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application and giving effect to of rights in international law may catalyse an upwards
harmonisation of rights between the domestic and international sphere. Domestic
constitutional and other rights‐protecting standards can be invigorated by international human
rights law, and international human rights law can evolve by reference to domestic standards in
general with international adjudicatory bodies attempting to recognise ‘tipping points’ based
on state practice as well as on principle and clearly articulated treaty‐based standards.
Such an approach to international human rights law is particularly apposite in situations where
domestic courts are grappling with the meaning of constitutional standards in their
contemporary context. While the ‘list’ of legally protected rights in either international human
rights law treaties or constitutional documents is generally static (apart from in cases of
amendment of the core document), the content of those rights is not necessarily static. Indeed,
it is arguable that in order for constitutions to remain ‘fit for purpose’ the content of the
protected rights must evolve over time. Thus, for example, the right to privacy may be one that
is constantly protected but its content may change over time: does it, for example, include a
right for celebrities to be free from invasive media coverage even if there is a public appetite
for such coverage?19 Does it include a right for our private, adult and consensual sexual activity
to be free from state interference even if some people find such activity morally abhorrent?20
These questions may not have been in the minds of the drafters of constitutions and
international instruments but they are questions of considerable contemporary importance
that our human and civil rights law must address unless it is to become entirely detached from
the real‐life challenges that people face.
In trying to reach conclusions on whether or not our rights‐protecting legal standards protect
individuals in circumstances of this kind, a court ought to have recourse to a wide variety of
sources including—I argue—international human rights law (where the decision is being made
by a domestic court) and comparative constitutional law and state practice (where the decision
is being made by an international adjudicatory body). In this way, both bodies of law can aid the
evolution of the other. Indeed, as the next part of this Article shows, such a synergistic and
catalytic relationship between domestic and international law is possible and has actually been
evident in relation to sexual and gender rights in the Council of Europe, where the European
Court of Human Rights has made considerable use of its ‘consensus’ approach to its
interpretation of the right to privacy in the European Convention on Human Rights when faced
with questions of sexual and gender identity.
19

For a story of such evolution see Gavin Phillipson, Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law
Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act 66 MODERN LAW REVIEW 726 (2003) and the House of Lords decision in
Campbell (Appellant) v. MGN Limited (Respondents) [2004] UKHL 22
20

The Irish Supreme Court originally held that, in constitutional terms, it did not: Norris v Attorney General [1984]
IR 36. The European Court of Human Rights, however, held that in ECHR terms it did: Norris v Ireland (1988) 13
EHRR 186.
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III. LGBT RIGHTS IN (WESTERN) EUROPE
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to respect for, inter
alia, one’s private and family life. It has loomed large in the rich vein of jurisprudence on
lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) rights produced by the European Court of Human
Rights. Article 8 provides:
1.
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2.
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well‐being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
The right to private life has been used to challenge laws that criminalise homosexual sex and
allow sexual orientation to be a used as a bar to certain institutions or employment. Building on
what has been a very expansive interpretation of the right to privacy within Article 8 is the right
to family life. The Court’s interpretation of “family” has been a channel through which many
LGBT rights campaigners have aimed to acquire recognition and protection for their family
forms regardless of marital status. As a result of Article 8 the State is precluded from exposing
private aspects of one’s life and also fixed with a positive obligation not to obstruct one from
choosing to express certain intimate aspects of one’s life. It is not, however, the case that the
State may not interfere in one’s Article 8 rights at all. Article 8.2 specifically outlines the
circumstances in which the state may legitimately interfere with the rights of the individual.
Legitimate interference requires three elements:
1.
Legal interference (i.e. the interference has the quality of law and was introduced
through legal measures);
2.
Necessity (i.e. the interference was necessary for the purposes of one of the heads
included in Article 8.2 – national security, public safety, national well‐being, public order, the
protection of health and morals and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others);
3.
Proportionality (i.e. the measures taken in order to secure one of the heads included in
Article 8.2 were proportionate inasmuch as they are directed towards that necessity and do not
overly infringe on the rights of individuals)
The jurisprudence on LGBT rights and Article 8 is important from this perspective because it
illustrates the capacity for domestic and international rights law to have a synergistic
relationship. As will be illustrated in the brief survey of some relevant jurisprudence that
follows, the European Court of Human Rights has afforded states a margin of appreciation in
relation to LGBT rights where appropriate but, once it has identified a tipping point by
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reference in particular to the legal and social conditions in nation states, it has narrowed that
margin of appreciation to naught thereby requiring member states to amend their domestic
law in line with the Court’s interpretation of the Convention or risk being in breach of their
international obligations.
The first ‘battleground’ in LGBT rights litigation under the European Convention was the right to
privacy and criminalisation of homosexuality. It has long been clear that ‘privacy’ as defined
within Article 8 covers an individual’s physical and moral integrity, including one’s sexual life.21
The first major case in this relation was Dudgeon v United Kingdom.22 Dudgeon claimed that the
criminalisation of consensual anal sex in Northern Ireland infringed on his right to privacy as a
homosexual man, whereas the United Kingdom claimed that it had a large margin of
appreciation (i.e. discretion) in situations where the protection of morals were concerned.
Furthermore the UK submitted that the majority of people in Northern Ireland found male
homosexuality morally unacceptable and feared that repealing this law would lead to
deterioration in moral standards. On that basis the UK claimed that maintaining criminalisation
for such acts was necessary, proportionate and within their rights.
While accepting that member states did have a broad margin of appreciation in issues of public
morality the Court held that “[a]s compared with the era when that legislation was enacted,
there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of consensual
homosexual behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member States of the
Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual
practices of the kind now in question” as criminal.23 In addition the Court held that even if an
argument could be made in favour of such legislation the detrimental effects it would have on
people’s capacities to choose how they lived their lives outweighed any such considerations. As
a result the legislation was deemed inconsistent with Article 8 and, subsequently, repealed by
the UK government.
One of only four dissenting judgments in Dudgeon was that of (Irish judge) Justice Walsh,
whose judgment concentrated on whether the law had any business delving into issues of
personal morality at all. Having concluded that if the State has a legitimate interest in trying to
ensure “the prevention of corruption and … the preservation of the moral ethos of its society”24
then it may legislate for personal morality, Walsh J. went on to consider the particular role of
religion and morality in Northern Ireland. He held that “[r]eligious beliefs in Northern Ireland
are very firmly held and directly influence the views and outlook of the vast majority of persons
21

X & Y v The Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235.

22

(1981) 4 EHRR 149.

23

Id, para. 60

24

Id, Judgment of Walsh J., para. 14
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in Northern Ireland on questions of sexual morality. In so far as male homosexuality is
concerned, and particularly sodomy, this attitude to sexual morality may appear to set the
people of Northern Ireland apart from many people in other communities in Europe, but
whether that fact constitutes a failing is, to say the least, debatable”.25 He concluded that there
had been no breach of Article 8 and that the UK government was entitled to maintain the
criminalisation legislation if it believes that decriminalisation would “have a damaging effect on
moral attitudes”.26
Given this approach from the Irish judge in Strasbourg it should, perhaps, have come as no
surprise that the Irish government failed to decriminalise homosexuality despite the fact that it
appeared to clearly contravene the European Convention as per Dudgeon. David Norris’ claim
that the same legislation as impugned in Dudgeon was unconstitutional on the basis of, inter
alia, the right to privacy had been rejected by the Irish Supreme Court in 1984.27 In the course
of that judgment O’Higgins CJ (as he then was) held that, through the references to God in the
Preamble to the Irish Constitution,28 the Irish people were “asserting and acknowledging their
obligation to Our Divine Lord Jesus Christ…proclaiming a deep religious conviction and
faith…with Christian beliefs” and that, as a result, any suggestion that the Constitution allowed
for “unnatural sexual conduct which Christian teaching held to be gravely sinful” was clearly
inaccurate. The clear role that Christian concepts of morality played in this Supreme Court
decision was also evident in the Irish government’s submissions to the European Court of
Human Rights in this case, where the State argued that “[w]ithin broad parameters the moral
25

Id, para. 17

26

Id, para. 20

27

Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36

28

The Preamble reads:

In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all
actions both of men and States must be referred,
We the people of Eire,
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers
through centuries of trial,
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our
Nation,
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that
the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our
country restored, and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.

Bunreacht na hÉireann (Constitution of Ireland) (1937).
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fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own institutions”.29 The Court, however, rejected
this claim on the grounds that it would lead to “unfettered”30 state discretion in the field of
morality.
Much the same decision was reached against Cyprus in 199331 and it is now clear that any laws
criminalising consensual homosexual activity will violate Article 8, although consensual heavy
sado‐masochistic activity between homosexuals appears not to enjoy Article 8 protection.32
This strong statement on the part of the Strasbourg court on moral regulation and
homosexuality led to further litigation claiming that excluding LGBTs from certain institutions or
employments on the basis of their homosexuality is also a violation of the right to privacy under
Article 8. Successful litigation was then taken in relation to gays in the military. One of the first
such cases was Lustig‐Praen & Beckett v United Kingdom33 involving soldiers who had been
dismissed from the Royal Navy as a result of their homosexuality. In relation to the second
applicant, Beckett, not only had he been dismissed for being gay but the nature of the
investigation leading to his dismissal had been abusive. For example he was asked whether he
had bought pornography, whether he had been abused as a child, whether he was “the butch
or the bitch” on the occasion of his first intercourse with his current partner, whether he used
condoms and sex aids, whether he had sex in public, whether his parents knew of his sexual
orientation and what kind of bars he frequented.34 At the time of the case the military was
governed by, inter alia, the Armed Forces’ Policy and Guidelines on Homosexuality as updated
by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. The Guidelines provided that homosexuality
was “incompatible with service in the armed forces” because of the close living conditions and
because “homosexual behaviour can cause offence, polarise relationships, induce ill‐discipline
and, as a consequence, damage morale and unit effectiveness”. Arguments of this nature
formed part of the UK’s submissions claiming no violation of Article 8.
Firstly, the Court found that investigations into the applicants’ homosexuality and, in particular,
interviews with the applicants and with third parties as to their sexual orientation and practices
constituted a direct interference with their rights to privacy. As a result, their consequent
dismissal from the armed forces violated Article 8. While the UK government accepted that the
actions might be deemed violatory they claimed that they were allowable under Article 8.2 of
29
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the Convention based on the legitimate aim of maintaining morale among military personnel
and, as a result, of ensuring the fighting power and effectiveness of the armed forces. The
government further argued that they were entitled to a large margin of appreciation in this
issue given the divisiveness of the issue in the UK and the special military context. The
government strongly refuted any suggestion of homophobia, claiming instead that the concerns
grounding the policy were genuinely held and based on the experiences of those accustomed to
the pressures of service life. On the contrary the applicants claimed that the policy was based
on simple prejudice.
The court accepted that states had a right to impose restrictions on individual rights where they
jeopardised the effectiveness of the armed forces, but that such threats to operational
effectiveness had to be substantiated by reference to specific examples.35 In considering
whether sufficient reasons existed to believe that homosexuals in the armed forces would
deplete morale the Court found that “the perceived problems which were identified in [a
relevant] report as a threat to the fighting power and operational effectiveness of the armed
forces were founded solely upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards
those of homosexual orientation”36 and that to the extent that they represented “a
predisposed bias”37 towards homosexuals they could not be taken to justify violations of Article
8 rights. Rather the Court felt that codes of conduct should be introduced, analogous to those
introduced in relation to service members of colour and women in the military. On the basis
that no objective and rational justification had been advanced to justify the Article 8 violation
the Court held that the Convention did not permit dismissal from the armed forces on the basis
of sexual orientation and the UK did not have a wide enough margin of appreciation to
perpetuate this policy.38
In addition the right to privacy within Article 8 has been used to base claims relating to unequal
ages of consent for homosexual and heterosexual sexual activity. In L & V v Austria39 the Court
considered whether different ages of consent for heterosexual and homosexual sex were a
violation of the right to privacy in Article 8. The applicant had been convicted of illegal
homosexual sex having had oral sex with a fifteen‐year‐old and claimed that the fact that he
would not have committed any criminal offence had he done so with a female partner was a
violation of his Article 8 rights. He also presented a broader social argument that suggested that
the law as it stood implied that younger people required more protection as against adults in
homosexual relations than in heterosexual relations. This, he submitted, hampered gay
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teenagers in developing their sexual identities and attached “a social stigma to their
relationships with adult men and to their sexual orientation in general”.40
Significantly the Court held that although there were previous cases from the Commission that
allowed differential ages of consent the Convention itself was “a living instrument, which has to
be interpreted in the light of present‐day conditions.”41 Given the fact that most Convention
member states had equalized their ages of consent, a differential age of consent must be
capable of objective and reasonable justification in order to avoid violating the Convention. The
criminalization of the complainant on the basis of differential ages of consent was therefore
found to be in violation of Article 8.
The European Court of Human Rights has also established that the right to privacy includes a
right to identity. The main issue faced by the Court, however, has been the extent to which a
State is obliged to recognise one’s identity, particularly where someone has undergone gender
realignment surgery. Most of the cases taken in relation to identity and privacy concern the
birth certificate and whether or not a state is required to put in place a mechanism for
amendment of the birth certificate following gender realignment. This issue can cause
particular difficulties as, in general, birth certificates are records of historical fact i.e. they are
designed to record facts as of the time of birth. In order to assess gender at the time of birth,
purely biological criterion tends to be applied and even then this tends to be based on visual
indicators of gender. Where it emerges that those biological criterion did not accurately reflect
one’s gender many people seek amendment of the birth certificate, but as the certificate is an
historical record states often claim that it should not be changed.
In Rees v United Kingdom,42 a case concerning a post‐operative female‐to‐male complainant,
the Court stressed the lack of consensus among the Council of Europe states as regards the
means by which a state should give effect to one’s right to respect for their private life and
identity. In fact the Court held that the law was going through “a transitional stage” in this
respect and, as a result, that States enjoyed a very wide margin of appreciation in this respect.43
As it stood transsexuals in the UK were in a position to change their name by deed poll and to
have that change recognised on a number of official documents, including passports. By
indicating one’s preferred prefix the Court felt that this procedure went some way towards
affording respect to one’s Article 8 rights. Despite this, however, there were certain situations
in which a resident in the UK was required to use the unchangeable birth certificate in order to
confirm their identity, which caused considerable embarrassment, shame and hurt for the
40
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applicant. This notwithstanding the Court felt that amending a birth certificate would constitute
falsification of facts at the time of birth and that where, as in the UK, there were some schemes
in place by which realigned gender can be recognised requiring the state to amend a birth
certificate would be extending the state’s obligations too far. This decision was based to a large
extent on the margin of appreciation of the state and the lack of legal, psychological, medical
and scientific consensus extant at the time.
Rees was quickly followed by Cossey v United Kingdom,44 which concerned a post‐operative
male‐to‐female complainant. Once again the complainant alleged that the UK’s failure to allow
for amendment of a birth certificate was a violation of Cossey’s Article 8 privacy rights. The
Court did not depart from its Rees decision as a result of the fact that it felt the decision
remained in‐line with current societal conditions. The State’s margin of appreciation, therefore,
remained wide: it was clear that one’s identity must be recognised but the means by which it
would be recognised and respected could differ from state to state. In the later case of Sheffield
& Horsham v United Kingdom45 the Court upheld those earlier decision but significantly did
‘scold’ the UK for not having advanced the means of recognition and respect since the Rees and
Cossey judgments.
The first case in which an applicant successfully used Article 8 to oblige the state to extend
official recognition of realigned gender was B v France.46 In France the applicant was strictly
confined in terms of choice of name and gender was encoded in a personal identity number
which was required for a variety of interactions with government and private entities. As a
result of this, and because the sophisticated French system of recording personal identity
would require only minor changes, the Court found that France was required to recognise the
applicant’s gender. Interestingly, this decision was not based on the state’s margin of
appreciation or on changes in common consensus; rather it was based on the specific
circumstances within France and implications for the applicant. B was not, therefore, in conflict
with the earlier decisions in Rees, Cossey and Sheffield.
It was not until Goodwin v United Kingdom47 that the Strasbourg court substantially changed its
stance in this relation. Christine Goodwin was a post‐operative male‐to‐female transsexual who
sought, inter alia, to have her birth certificate amended to reflect her realigned gender.
Goodwin noted particularly that the UK government had failed to take appropriate steps to
respect her identity despite the Court’s advice in previous cases to keep the law under review
and in line with changes in comparative law. She stressed the rapid changes in scientific
understanding of and social attitudes towards transsexuals and complained that these were not
matched by legal reform. In particular she stressed the various laws that disadvantaged
44
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transsexuals who could not amend their birth certificate and the significant distress and hurt
caused in one’s every day life as a result of such laws and social conditions. The respondent
government submitted that as there was no generally agreed or accepted approach among the
member states in relation to transsexuals the UK enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in this
matter and did not violate Article 8.
In its assessment of the merits the Strasbourg Court held that in order to be effective the
Convention must have regard to the changing conditions within individual states and the
members states generally and, as a result, that it was not strictly bound to follow the judgments
starting with Rees. The Court particularly found that there was an inconsistency in English law
whereby gender realignment surgery could be carried out by the National Health Service, which
therefore recognises transsexualism, but on the other hand this realigned gender was not fully
recognised by the state. The Court noted significant growth in knowledge and understanding of
transsexualism and held that there was no scientific argument against legal recognition of
realigned gender. The Court found that only four member states (including the United
Kingdom) had no mechanism of legal recognition following gender realignment and was
influenced by the emerging international consensus on this issue. All of this combined indicated
that an international legal, social, scientific, psychological and medical consensus on
transsexualism was emerging. Given all of the above, and given the existence of a number of
law reform proposals for legal recognition within the UK itself, the Court held that there had
been a reduction in the state’s margin of appreciation and, as a result, a violation of Christine
Goodwin’s Article 8 rights.
This short and selective survey of the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to LGBT rights
illustrates the type of synergistic relationship that is possible between international and
domestic human rights law. Where appropriate, the Court used the margin of appreciation to
allow states some discretion in how to approach LGBT rights but where a tipping point could be
identified—based largely on emergent practice in other states—the Court issued clear
interpretations of the content and scope of the right to privacy as it related to LGBT rights and
dramatically reduced the margin of appreciation. The margin of appreciation is a key concept
within ECHR law and gives states discretion in questions of particular sensitivity. Importantly,
however, the margin of appreciation does not constitute a carte blanche for states to do as they
wish. As a consensus emerges, particularly on issues of sensitivity or issues in relation to which
the law may be in a transitional stage, the margin will become narrower until it is no longer
acceptable for a state to operate in a manner inconsistent with the convention rights as given
effect by common European practice. The margin of appreciation therefore decreases in size as
consensus increases. By corollary, as the margin decreases the obligation on states to amend
their domestic law to recognise changing consensus increases even before a de jure obligation
arises through a bright‐line judgment of the Court clarifying that a Convention provision can
now be said to protect certain behaviours under the rubric of privacy. In addition, the narrower
the margin and greater the consensus the more weighty the jurisprudence of the Court can be
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as an interpretive aid in domestic proceedings where analogous questions—as to whether, for
example, constitutional privacy rights include a right to have one’s realigned gender recognised
in law—are at bar.

IV: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND US CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Some readers will understandably question the use of European human rights law to illustrate
the capacity for synergy between international and domestic human rights law in the United
States. Are there not, it might be asked, serious and perhaps even insurmountable structural
and other obstacles to the similar use of international human rights law in the United States?
To be sure there are some differences that have to be considered, but in my view none of these
are insurmountable.
Firstly it must be acknowledged that, through their ratification of the European Convention on
Human Rights, all member states have accepted that the decisions of the Court to which they
are party are binding upon them in international law.48 This creates an international compulsion
to change domestic law where inconsistency has been discerned by the European Court of
Human Rights itself. This international obligation, together with the reputational and
potentially other sanctions that might flow from a failure to implement the judgment, certainly
has the potential to impact on the extent to which states who are party to particular litigation
react to it. However, other states—i.e. those that were not parties to the particular litigation—
do not have the same obligation. Nevertheless the potential for the Court to find other states in
breach of the Convention in comparable cases (as happened, for example, in Norris v Ireland in
the wake of Dudgeon v United Kingdom considered above) might well be a motivating factor. In
cases where there is margin of appreciation left to states in relation to what the Convention
requires there may also be a temptation not to implement domestic legal changes in response
to European Court of Human Rights decisions dealing with other states. Even then, however,
the Court’s commitment to evolutive and dynamic interpretation of the Convention with a view
to effective rights protection may dissuade states from dragging their heels to too great an
extent. The structure of the European Convention on Human Rights and standing of the Court’s
decisions within that structure may, then, be an element that ought to be taken into account in
explaining or reading the LGBT rights example laid out above.49
The United States, in contrast, does not tend to become party to individual complaints
mechanisms in international human rights law.50 There is, then, perhaps a different level of
48

Article 46(1), European Convention on Human Rights (supra note 7).

49

For a concise description of this structure and of enforcement mechanisms see FIONA DE LONDRAS & CLIONA KELLY,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: OPERATION, IMPACT AND ANALYSIS (2010), 133‐141
50

The United States has failed to engage with any of the primary complaints mechanisms in international human
rights law. Under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (supra note
16) the Human Rights Committee may hear an individual complaint against a state; however the United States has
not ratified the Protocol. Under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women

18

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 03

obligation when it comes to the decisions of such institutions relating to individual complaints
against other states. However, even though—for example—the United States is not subject to
the individual complaints mechanism of the Human Rights Committee under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is still a party to the Covenant itself and therefore still
has an international legal obligation under that Covenant. The decisions of the Human Rights
Committee can touch on and elucidate the content and scope of rights within that Covenant
and therefore be relevant to the United States. In the periodic reports submitted by the US,
compliance with the Covenant will be judged by reference to its meaning as articulated in, inter
alia, individual complaints decisions of the Committee. Therefore there is an obligation—albeit
perhaps an obtuse one—to comply with these decisions where they are generalisable beyond
the specific facts of individual disputes. Complying with that obligation can require changes to
domestic law and, indeed, compliance—in the sense of upwards harmonisation of rights
protecting standards—can incorporate the interpretation of constitutional civil rights by
reference to, inter alia, international human rights standards as articulated by international
human rights adjudicatory bodies. The synergistic relationship between the two is not limited
to scenarios where the judgments or decisions of those adjudicatory bodies are binding stricto
sensu on the individual state.
The second comment that might be made about the appropriateness of the European example
to the United States is the alleged difference in the relevance of international law to monist and
dualist states. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland, all of the state parties to
the European Convention on Human Rights have monist legal systems broadly defined. This
means—again at a necessary level of generalisation—that international law ratified by the state
is said to flow directly and without barrier into the domestic law of the ratifying state and is
therefore subject to be pleaded in domestic proceedings. The United Kingdom and Ireland are,
in contrast, dualist states51 where—up until 1998 and 2003 respectively—the European
Convention on Human Rights had not been expressly incorporated.52 However, as I have
(supra note 10) similar petitions may be heard under the First Optional Protocol (G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (2000), entered into force Dec. 22, 2000); however the United
States has failed to ratify this treaty despite signing it on 17 July 1980. Under the UN Convention against Torture
(G.A. res. 39/46, [annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)], entered into force June
26, 1987) individual complaints can be heard if the state party has made a declaration to this effect under Article
22; the United States has failed to make any such declaration. The International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into force 1 July 2003) also allows for an individual complaint
mechanism, which will come into effect once ten states have made the necessary declaration under Article 77; the
United States has neither signed nor ratified this Convention.
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written elsewhere, dualism and anti‐internationalism are not necessary bedfellows.53 In fact, I
argue that among dualist jurisdictions there is a spectrum of internationalisation relating to
unincorporated international law.54 Thus, in some dualist states judges in the superior courts
are quite willing to have recourse to international human rights law in the course of
constitutional interpretation—this is quite evident in South Africa where the Constitution
expressly calls for such attention to be paid to international human rights law,55 but such an
express reference is not required. The United States Constitution provides for neither a strictly
dualist nor a strictly monist system of dealing with international law. The Supremacy Clause
provides for customary international law to be federal common law56 and jurisprudential
development has resulted in what are known as self‐executing treaties being considered self‐
incorporating and non‐self‐executing treaties requiring express incorporation.57 Incorporation
of non‐self‐executing treaties makes those treaties binding in domestic law. This, of course, is
relevant where one is attempting to assert a treaty‐based right in domestic proceedings.
However, the kind of synergistic relationship between international human rights law and
domestic constitutional law envisaged by this author does not hinge on whether a piece of
international law is binding domestically or not. In fact, it does not even hinge on whether the
United States has ratified the particular piece of international law. It is, rather, concerned with
the idea that international human rights law can and should be seen as a persuasive body of
law relevant to constitutional interpretation of civil rights, particularly in relation to the content
and scope of those civil rights in contemporary circumstances. When Kennedy J., for example,
referred to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Roper v Simmons58 he was not
claiming that the Convention was internationally binding on the United States (it is not as the
US has not ratified it). Neither was he asserting the domestic justiciability of the Convention.
Rather, Kennedy J. was using the Convention and the standards set down within it as a
benchmark for the appropriate scope of children’s rights in relation to punishment, which then
1998 see DAVID HOFFMAN & JOHN ROWE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 (2006);
on the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 see FIONA DE LONDRAS & CLIONA KELLY, supra note 50.
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could be applied in the process of constitutional interpretation. It is this kind of relationship
that typifies the synergy possible between international and domestic human or civil rights law.
The constitutional structures in the United States do not, I argue, serve as an insurmountable
barrier to the use of international human rights law in constitutional interpretation and ought
not, in my view, to be constructed as doing so.
Recognising the potential of international human rights law to be an effective and helpful
persuasive source in constitutional interpretation requires a particular attitudinal approach to
that body of law. Discussions of whether international or domestic law is ‘superior’ are deeply
unhelpful in any attempt to ensure progression towards upwards harmonisation in rights
protection and can arguably have the effect of hardening attitudes against international law
among domestic law practitioners, educators and judges. When the common dignitary core of
international and domestic rights standards considered in Part I above is recognised, and when
the weighting given to unincorporated or un‐ratified international human rights law is that of
persuasive authority within a common law jurisdiction, any fears of international human rights
law as interloper ought to be dispelled. Comparative constitutional law is not generally seen as
an interloping body of law, after all.59 The difference is, perhaps, that when making their
decisions constitutional courts do not purport to be making universally applicable law to which
other states are to be measured and, to some extent, international human rights law
adjudicatory bodies might be said to. But those international bodies are making universally
applicable law in the international sphere.
As a matter of international law a state may be obliged to ensure that its law and practice
adheres to certain rights‐based standards. The claim is not that this is the case as a matter of
domestic law although, in practical terms, domestic law is likely to be examined for its
compatibility with those international standards by those international bodies. Those
international bodies are, however, assessing compatibility with international law and not with
domestic constitutional law. In the process of constitutional interpretation, domestic superior
courts such as the United States Supreme Court are (generally) assessing the compatibility of
law or governmental action with domestic law unless international standards are said to be
binding. A truly synergistic relationship between domestic and international human and civil
rights law would see courts—where applicable—considering whether the scope and content of
constitutional rights against which governmental action is measured can and should be
interpreted by reference to international human rights law (as well as other comparative
sources).
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V. CONCLUSION
Moving the discourse away from questions of superiority or inferiority of international and
domestic human rights law in domestic litigation allows us to refocus debates on the
appropriate use of international human rights law in domestic proceedings. This refocusing
reminds us that, when used as an aid to constitutional interpretation, international human
rights law can develop a synergy with domestic rights law (whether termed ‘human rights’ or
‘civil rights’ law) that enables the upwards harmonisation of these bodies of law so that
domestic law protects individual rights effectively. International human rights laws’ various
adjudicatory bodies—such as regional courts and treaty‐based committees—produce
jurisprudence that can be particularly useful in interpreting the scope and content of rights in a
contemporary and effective manner, taking into account developments in a range of states.
This jurisprudence offers an obvious persuasive value to the United States Supreme Court when
it is grappling with analogous questions to those international institutions, albeit in domestic
contexts.
This is not to suggest that these international courts’ and committees’ decisions are binding on
the United States: unless the US has accepted their jurisdictions then they are not, either as a
matter of international or domestic law. However, non‐binding decisions can offer guidance to
superior courts in all jurisdictions. Where the basic value underlying the rights protecting
provisions in the international and domestic sphere is analogous and essentially dignitary, the
persuasive value of this international jurisprudence appears to be all the more obvious. Courts
all over the world—both domestic and international—are constantly struggling with how to
ensure that their basic texts are fit for purpose while not mutilating their meaning beyond clear
literal and teleological grounds. Inter‐institutional and inter‐jurisdictional learning is both
sensible from a common sense perspective and productive from the perspective of catalysing
upwards harmonisation of rights protection. This has, as illustrated in Part II, happened and
worked in the context of LGBT rights in the Council of Europe and, as argued in Part III, the
structural differences between Europe and the United States are not so immense as to make a
similar process impossible and inappropriate in relation to the US Constitution. Writing to
Samuel Kercheval in 1816, Thomas Jefferson stated:
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem them like the ark of
the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a
wisdom more than human and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that
age well; I belonged to it and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the
present but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government
is worth a century of book‐reading; and this they would say themselves were they to rise from
the dead.
It seems difficult to disagree with the sentiment. Learning from experience—whether our own
or that of others—and ensuring the contemporaneousness of the fundamental guarantees of
the Constitution, without eroding their substance and dignitary foundation, are naturally
collative processes. International human rights law is another source that can and should be
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reached for in the process of interpreting domestic constitutional guarantees in the United
States and, indeed, elsewhere.

